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Abstract
We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician
services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We
show that this prospective payment system involves −  compared
to a fee-for-service remuneration system −  a severe coordination
problem, which potentially leads to the "treadmill effect". For the
institutional setting of German primary physician service we
provide evidence for decreasing reimbursement per treatment,
which is consistent with theoretical predictions. When market entry
is possible, a budget can be efficiency enhancing, if in addition a
price floor is used.
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The German health care system currently undergoes a new round of restruc-
turing by the proposed introduction of the global budget. To stabilize the
share of health care expenditure on the gross national product the total ex-
penditures to all suppliers in the health care market will be ﬁxed. Already
in 1993 in the German physician market there was a switch from the cost
reimbursement system to a remuneration system with a ﬁxed budget to stop
rising health care expenditures.1 In this prospective payment system with
a ﬁxed total budget the individual physician learns only retroactively how
much he has actually earned: He faces the strategic uncertainty how his
professional colleagues act.
Looking at the German outpatient market the following interesting ob-
servations can be made: Since the 90’s the average income of physicians has
decreased substantially. Furthermore, since the introduction of the budget
system, the point value has fallen.
In this paper we suggest one possible explanation for these observations,
and argue how they may be related to each other. For this purpose we in-
vestigate the interaction in the market for physician service when the budget
is ﬁxed. By analyzing the strategic uncertainty of a single doctor we show
that the market for physician service can - due to a coordination problem -
be stuck in an equilibrium which involves bankruptcy and therefore market
exit. This equilibrium can arise, because - given a certain total budget -
physicians have to augment their number of treatments to avoid bankruptcy.
As a consequence a downward spiral of prices ﬁnally forces some physicians
to exit the market. Our analysis suggests that the introduction of a speciﬁc
1Some other countries have also gathered experience with total budgets. Fixed budget
systems for example are used in the physician remuneration system of France, the United
Kingdom and are also partially used in the U.S.A., i.e. in the Medicare services. Although
the federal government in the United States have proposed the option of a ﬁxed budget
within the Clinton health plan, global budgets have been introduced only within a small
percentage in the health industry in the U.S.A. In Canada since 1990 payment for physician
services in the fee-for-service sector has shifted from an open-ended system to ﬁxed global
budgets (Hurley and Card, 1996).
2mechanism of a price ﬂoor into the German market for physician services
could solve this coordination problem.
Our model belongs to the ﬁeld of research where alternative reimburse-
ment schemes are investigated and compared.2 Many theoretical papers con-
sider physician response to the form of reimbursement rule, generally focus-
ing on fee-for-service versus capitation reimbursement.3 Consequently many
of the empirical papers have examined the eﬀects of exogenous changes in
physician remuneration programs.4 However, strategic aspects (in our case
induced through a ﬁxed budget) have not been investigated so far.
We compare the remuneration system of fee-for-service, which we call
price system, with the prospective payment system of a ﬁxed total budget,
which we call point system. In this payment system the individual physician
receives a certain number of points per treatment which depends on the kind
of service he renders. At the end of each quarter the ﬁxed budget for all
physicians is divided by the sum of points submitted by all physicians for
reimbursement, which determines the (ex-post) point value. Therefore from
the point of view of an individual physician the amount he receives from
the reimbursement center does not only depend on the sum of points of his
treatments but also on the number of treatments of all other doctors in the
market. We investigate how physicians act when they are able to control the
number of treatments.
In a general model of physician behaviour with a price system we show
that physicians maximize their utility, taking into account monetary and
eﬀort cost, if prices are high. However, if prices are low, physicians forgo
their eﬀort costs to avoid bankruptcy. They expand their treatments to the
target where monetary costs will be covered. If prices are getting too low,
some physicians are forced to declare bankruptcy.
In contrast to this price system we ﬁnd that in the budget system there
2For an overview see Gaynor (1994), who summarizes industrial organizational aspects
in the market for physician services.
3See Newhouse (1992) and Ellis and McGuire (1993) for reviews.
4For summaries see Rice and Labelle (1989), Dranove and Wehner (1994) and Scott
and Hall (1995).
3exists a coordination problem. Depending on the size of the budget, the
possible equilibria have one of three diﬀerent structures. If the budget is
very high, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies where the
individual physician behaves as a proﬁt maximizer. If the budget is very low,
there exists a unique equilibrium where a proportion of physicians exit the
market and the others work very hard to avoid bankruptcy. In the scenario
with an intermediate budget there exist the two equilibrium outcomes as
described above and one additional equilibrium with an intermediate point
value, where all physicians work hard5, but there is no market exit. We argue
that this last equilibrium is unstable.
Physicians do not seem to coordinate themselves on an equilibrium with
high point values. However there exist two possible coordination devices.
First, the physicians are guaranteed that the budget will be augmented if
the point-value drops by more than a predetermined percentage. This point
value guarantee will not be used in equilibrium and the budget target will
be met. Second, alternatively a prospective maximal number of treatments
per physician can be implemented into the budget. However, this second
coordination device involves high information and administration eﬀort.
In the paper we also analyze the equilibrium when entry into the market
is possible. Physician will enter the market only if the budget is large enough
and if their utility by entering the market exceeds their outside option. In
this case we show that a ﬁxed budget can lead to a desired allocation of
human capital.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the German
outpatient medical care system. In Section 3 a basic model of physician
choice where physicians can induce demand is presented. In Section 4 we in-
troduce the ﬁxed budget phenomenon into our framework and compare the
two diﬀerent approaches of reimbursement. We study how strategic inter-
action of physicians leads to a coordination problem. In Section 5 evidence
for the predictions derived in Section 4 is given. In Section 6 we derive ways
5This phenomenon, where physicians increase their treatments is commonly referred to
the term“treadmill eﬀect”, see e.g. Breyer (2000).
4how to solve the coordination problem. Then, in Section 7 market entry of
physicians is included into the model. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Reimbursement scheme in Germany
Until the ’90s in the public health system, which covers 90 percent of the Ger-
man health market, physicians were paid on a fee-for-service basis.6 Since
the health care reform in 1993 we ﬁnd administered caps on the total budget
for outpatient care.7 Right now the costs may not rise faster than labor’s
share in national income. In 1998, outpatient care for physicians8 accounted
for about 17,4 percent (more than 40 billion Deutsch Marks) of the total
healthcare bill paid by the statutory funds in Germany (see Federal Asso-
ciation of Panel Doctors (1999), Table G3). The segment outpatient care
is largely made up of the services provided by doctors and dentists with
their own practices. At the end of 1998, there were about 125,000 practicing
physicians in various ﬁelds in outpatient care and about 60,000 dentists in
Germany.9
In the current German debate the question arises whether a point system
with a ﬁxed budget, where each treatment has a certain amount of points
serves as the adequate reimbursement scheme for physicians.10 Currently, at
the end of each accounting period a ﬁxed budget for all physicians will be
divided by the sum of the points of all physicians. Therefore the value of
a treatment is determined ex post. For example, if the physicians submit a
6The other ten percent are ﬁnanced by private health insurers. See Federal Association
of Panel Doctors (1999), table G1.
7This outpatient medical care is provided primarily by physicians in independent prac-
tices. The term ”outpatient care” refers to medical services that can be provided outside
of the inpatient wards of a hospital.
8Outpatient care for dentists accounted for about 10 percent of the total health care
bill.
9See Federal Association of Panel Doctors (1999), Table A1 and HypoVereinsbank
(1999) for dentists.
10Alternative reimbursement systems are among others the price-system, where each
treatment is reimbursed by a ﬁxed price - our benchmark case fee-for-service - and the
capitation system, where each doctor receives a ﬁxed amount per capita.
5high number of points at the end of a quarter, the value per point drops.
In Germany associations of panel doctors or dentists run the reimbursement
center in accordance with a uniform evaluation standard11, that allocates a
speciﬁc number of points to some 2,000 outpatient services.12 The regional
associations that administer the reimbursement can exert some inﬂuence via
separate individual budgets by applying fee distribution criteria. While the
number of points assigned to a particular service is uniformly negotiated by
the Federal-level association and the statutory funds (insurances), the value
assigned to the points can diﬀer from region to region.
3 The basic model
We present a simple model to capture the relevant aspects of the strategic
uncertainty in the market for physician service. Especially we draw attention
to the diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes of the two methods of reimbursement,
the fee-for-service system, what we call price system, and the prospective
payment system with a ﬁxed total budget, which will be called point system.
We start by developing a model of the behaviour of the physician in the price
system. To do so, the following assumptions are made:
Assumption 1
1. A physician ﬁnances his practice by taking out a loan of size F, which
has to be paid back at the end of the period.
2. Running costs consist of monetary costs c1(n) and eﬀort costs c2(n),
with c0
i > 0 and c00
i > 0 for i = 1;2. n is the number of treatments.
3. If a physician cannot repay his loan, he faces bankruptcy costs of BK.
At the beginning of the period a physician is confronted with ﬁx costs and
other liquidity problems. Physicians require equipment, have to pay rents,
11In Germany known as the “EBM” (Einheitlicher Bewertungsmaßstab).
12In Germany the primary physician service is assured by this institution which is called
‘Kassen¨ arztliche Vereinigung’(KV), and which acts as a representative for all physicians
by dealing with the interest group of the health insurer.
6pay for their employees, etc. Therefore, as implied by Assumption 1.1, a
bank loan of size F is needed to ﬁnance his expenditures.13 For instance,
a dentist, who decided to open his own practice in 1998 had to ﬁnance an
average volume of 548,000 D-Mark.14 Assumption 1.2 introduces two sorts
of variable costs. The monetary costs c1(n) have to be paid by the physician,
while costs c2(n) describe the disutility he has from providing the service.
This might refer to the time spent on work, the eﬀort he has to put in, etc.
For simplicity we only consider a single kind of treatment. In addition the
physician is confronted by bankruptcy costs BK (Assumption 1.3), which
only occur if he cannot pay back his bank loan F. These costs should also
be interpreted as private, monetary and non-monetary costs. In the German
system, for example, the license fee will be foregone when the practice of a
physician is closed and of course, the physician bears a reputational cost for
future working possibilities.15
Following Assumption 1, if p is the price per treatment, the utility of a





pn ¡ c1(n) ¡ c2(n) ¡ F if pn ¡ c1(n) ¸ F
¡c2(n) ¡ BK if pn ¡ c1(n) < F
(1)
If the physician does not go bankrupt, his utility (proﬁt) is income minus
costs. However, in case of bankruptcy all monetary income accrues to the
bank, so the physician is left with his eﬀort costs and his private bankruptcy
costs.
We now turn to the question of how n, the number of treatments is
determined. As an empirical fact we observe that physicians act diﬀerently
under diﬀerent reimbursement systems. For instance in Germany the number
13Allowing for diﬀerent Fi for diﬀerent physicians does not change the basic results, as
shown in Section 4.
14HypoVereinsbank (1999)
15Modelling bankruptcy costs as private costs is a standard tool in the principal-agent
analysis, see e.g. Schmidt (1997).
7of treatments without proper medical justiﬁcation seems to have increased in
the last decade. An interesting example are the operations of gall bladders.
Between 1990 and 1996 their number had risen by 150 percent through the
introduction of outpatient endoscopic operation techniques. However, for the
same indication, physicians show a rate of operation which is 84% lower than
the rate of the average population.16 Even the German Society of Radiology
claims that in 1998 every second out of 100 million x-rays was not necessary.
The way to model this phenomena, which is commonly called Supplier-
induced Demand, is however very heterogeneous (for an overview, see e.g.
Gaynor (1994)). In one strand of the literature physicians can induce de-
mand directly. They just choose the number of treatments. Here, limits
to inducement are given either via target incomes (Evans, 1974) or because
the degree of inducement enters utility negatively (e.g. McGuire and Pauly,
1992). Another approach models informational diﬀerences explicitly by com-
paring medical services to credence goods. Examples are Emons (1997),
Wolinsky (1993) and Dranove (1988). We are in line with the ﬁrst strand.
However we do not assume that inducement is limited via an exogenous target
income or via a possible negative utility, but by cost of treatment instead.17
Therefore, in our model physicians have complete control over the number
of treatments.
Assumption 2
The choice variable of a physician is n, the number of treatments. The overall
supply in the market determines the demand for medical services.
In a more elaborate model one would like to constrain the possibilities
to induce demand by informational asymmetries between physician and pa-
tient. However, for the purpose of the present paper, it is only required that
the physician can induce demand to some degree, so the proposed form of
16Speech of the state secretary of the health ministry Christa Nickels at the health care
congress on May, 11, 1999 in Heidelberg/Germany.
17Adding that the degree of inducement inﬂuences utility negatively would not change
the results.
8modeling seems appropriate. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 we can now solve
the maximization problem of the physician. Depending on the price p, three
regions for the optimal number of treatments are obtained.
Proposition (Fee for service) There exists a lower bound p and an upper
bound ¯ p with 0 < p < ¯ p, such that:
If p ¸ ¯ p the optimal number of treatments n¤(p) is such that the individual
physician equates price with marginal costs: p = c0
1(n¤) + c0
2(n¤). An
increase in price will lead to an increase in n:
dn¤(p)
dp > 0.
If p · p < ¯ p the optimal number of treatments n¤¤(p) is such that bankruptcy




If p < p the optimal number of treatments ˆ n is 0 and the individual physician
exits the market.
Proof Assume that the bankruptcy constraint of equation (1) is not binding.
Then maximizing this expression with respect to n yields p¡c0
1(n)¡c0
2(n) = 0.
This deﬁnes n¤ as a function of p. Using the implicit function theorem it
follows that n¤0(p) = 1
c100(n¤)+c200(n¤) which is positive as costs are convex.
Therefore, if p is large enough it will hold that pn¤(p)¡c1(n¤(p)) > F. This
proves the ﬁrst part of the Proposition.
Deﬁne ¯ p such that ¯ pn¤(¯ p) ¡ c1(n¤(¯ p)) = F. As c0
1(n¤(p)) < p, it follows
that for all p < ¯ p, pn¤(p) ¡ c1(n¤(p)) < F. Therefore, as long as p is not too
small, the bankruptcy constraint becomes exactly binding and the physician
chooses the optimal n¤¤(p) such that pn¤¤(p)¡c1(n¤¤(p)) = F. Again, using
the implicit function theorem gives n¤¤0(p) = ¡
n¤¤(p)
p¡c10(n¤¤(p)). In the region of
interest this expression is negative: The physician would never provide so
many treatments that the marginal monetary costs exceed the price. There-
fore c0
1(n¤¤(p)) < p. This proves the second part of the Proposition.
Now deﬁne p as the largest p < ¯ p such that either c2(n¤¤(p)) = BK or
c0
1(n¤¤(p)) = p. In the ﬁrst case, eﬀort costs equal the private bankruptcy
9costs. Therefore at this price the physician is indiﬀerent between going
bankrupt or providing n¤¤ treatments. In the latter case, marginal costs
equal price. In both cases, if prices fall below p, the physician will exit the
market.18 Due to the fact that n¤¤ increases if the price falls, the physician
will exit the market for all p < p. Q.E.D.
The implications of Proposition 1 can most easily be illustrated by Figure
1, which shows the supply curve of the physician.
Figure 1: The price system
For high prices, the supply curve is upward sloping. We call this region
Proﬁt maximization, as the physician behaves here like a standard proﬁt
maximizer, equating price with marginal costs. For intermediate prices, the
supply curve is downward sloping. To avoid bankruptcy the physician is
working harder, even if the price is declining. We call this region Target
income, as the physician works exactly so much that he covers his bank
loan. There is a long debate in the literature whether the so-called target-
income-hypothesis holds. This hypothesis usually augments the supplier-
18We regard the former scenario, where exit occurs due to large eﬀort costs, as more
plausible than the latter one. In general, monetary variable costs are relatively low, see
HypoVereinsbank (1998).
10induced demand theory, by noting that physicians will induce exactly so
much demand that some target level in income (or utility) is reached. One of
the main criticisms with this approach is that the target is not derived, but
just postulated. In our model, we obtain for some prices a target-income,
with an explicit explanation for the target: For intermediate prices physicians
work so much that they cover their costs. Note that one result of this model
is that the target is in income, and not in utility. Due to eﬀort costs, the
physician would prefer to supply less at higher prices.19 If the price is very
low, the physician exits the market and supplies nothing. This is indicated
with the bold part of the vertical axis in the graph. We can now turn to the
analysis of strategic interaction between physicians under a ﬁxed budget.
4 The budget system: Strategic uncertainty
In this section we investigate the strategic interaction in the market for physi-
cian services when the budget is ﬁxed. As described above, in a point system
with a global expenditure cap, the value of a point is determined ex-post. It
is given by the budget divided by the number of points all physicians accu-
mulate together. We want to capture the strategic element which arises in
such a setting. To do so, assume that a continuum of physicians exist. The
physicians are indexed by a parameter x which is distributed uniformly on
the line [0;1].20
Given a budget of size B, the structure of the game is the following:
Each individual physician x decides either to exit the market, which implies
that he sets n(x) = 0, or he stays in the market and chooses to provide the
number of treatments n(x) > 0. Depending on the number of treatments
chosen by the other physicians (n(y);y 6= x), the pay-oﬀs to physician x are
19For the debate about the target income hypothesis see e.g. Labelle, Stoddart, and
Rice (1994).
20Using a continuum rather than a discrete number of physicians implies that the in-
dividual supply of any physician has no consequence for the resulting point-value. This
seems to be a sensible assumption to make, given that e.g. in Germany more than 110.000




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
B R 1
0 n(y)dy n(x) ¡c1(n(x)) ¡ c2(n(x)) ¡ F
if B R 1
0 n(y)dyn(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) ¸ F
¡c2(n(x))¡BK
if B R 1
0 n(y)dyn(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) < F
(2)
The ﬁrst line of the payoﬀ-function is clear: If the expected price per treat-
ment, given by the expression B R 1
0 n(y)dy, is such that by working n(x) the
physician earns enough revenue not to go bankrupt, he obtains his proﬁt
minus the eﬀort costs of work. If he goes bankrupt (the second line), all his
monetary return is used to pay for the outstanding loan. So the individual
physician is left over with his eﬀort costs and the bankruptcy costs. For the
following proposition, we deﬁne ¯ n as the number of treatments a physician
supplies if the price is p (see Figure 1). Recall that p was the minimum price
at which an individual physician would be willing to stay in the market. De-
pending on the size of the budget, the possible equilibria have one of three
diﬀerent structures.
Proposition There exists a lower bound B and an upper bound ¯ B for the
budget, such that
If B < B < ¯ B there exist three equilibrium outcomes:
² E1 : 8x 2 [0;1] n(x) = argmaxn[ B
n(x)n ¡ c1(n) ¡ c2(n)]
² E2 : 8x 2 [0;1] n(x) solves B
n(x)n(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) = F
² E3: A proportion ® of physicians exits the market, and the other
physicians provide ¯ n treatments each. ® is determined such that
B = (1 ¡ ®)¯ np.
If B > ¯ B the unique equilibrium is of type E1.
If B < B the equilibrium outcome is of type E3.
12Proof See section A.1 in the appendix.
Here we outline the proof. This is done in 5 steps.
First: No physician inﬂuences the overall point-value by his own treatments.
Therefore, given the strategies of the others, the response function of the
physician is identical to the supply function we calculated in the previous
section, if we identify the price ˜ p on the y-axis with the point-value B R 1
0 n(y)dy.
This supply function is displayed again in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The point-system with an intermediate budget
Second: Assume that B R 1
0 n(y)dy 6= p. Then Figure 2 shows that the best
response of physician x is uniquely determined. Let this be some ˜ n. Now
it cannot be the case that any other physician supplies a diﬀerent number
of treatments, because if ˜ n is the optimal response for physician x, it must
be the optimal response for any other physician. Thus, as long as we are
not at the point of indiﬀerence between bankruptcy and working hard, the
equilibrium strategies must be the same for everyone.
Third: Assume that B R 1
0 n(y)dy = p. In that case physician x is indiﬀerent
between working ¯ n or exiting the market. As this holds for any physician, in
equilibrium there might be some physicians who exit the market and some
13others who supply ¯ n.21
Fourth: Now consider the budget. For Figure 2 we have chosen the budget
such that the line B=n cuts the supply curve twice, at points E1 and E2
(the possibility curve to the left). This corresponds to the scenario with an
intermediate budget. These two points are two equilibria; if everyone supplies
the number of treatments given at these points, then the ex-post price will
be such that this number of treatments was individually optimal in the ﬁrst
place. As can be seen from Figure 2, either all physicians work less hard and
enjoy a large point value (E1), or all physicians supply more at a lower point
value (E2) and just avoid bankruptcy. If some physicians exit the market
the budget line per active physician moves to the right. This is shown by
the possibility curve to the right in Figure 2 which has the functional form
p = B=((1¡®)n). If ® is chosen such that this line cuts the point E3 = (¯ n;p),
the third equilibrium is obtained. Some physicians work very hard, the others
exit the market, and they are all indiﬀerent between the two alternatives.
Fifth: If the budget is so large that B=n cuts the supply curve only once,
then the only possible equilibrium is the one where all physicians work little
and where the price per treatment is very high. This is displayed in Figure
3 by the intersection with the line to the right.22
If on the other hand the budget is so small that B=n does not even cut
the supply curve, (the budget line to the left in Figure 3), then the unique
equilibrium is the one where some physicians go bankrupt.
For the following discussion we concentrate on the case of an intermediate
budget, where all three forms of equilibria exist. The equilibrium at point
E1 in Figure 2 is, from the point of view of the physicians, the optimal
outcome. Everyone supplies treatment exactly to the point that (expected)
price equals marginal costs. There is no danger of going bankrupt. The
equilibria in points E2 and E3 diﬀer from the ﬁrst equilibrium in that the
physicians are supplying more treatments: They just avoid bankruptcy while
21In general, every physician could mix between exiting or supplying ¯ n.
22Formally, ¯ B is determined by
¯ B
¯ n = p:
14Figure 3: The point-system with a high and with a very small budget
at equilibrium point E3 some even exit the market.
These latter two equilibria are however, hard to distinguish empirically.
Remember that we modelled all physicians to have equal cost-functions, and
equal debts to be paid back. If we heterogenize the model, one would also
at equilibrium E2 expect some of the physicians, namely those with high
costs, to go bankrupt. The main diﬀerence between E2 and E3 is the nature
of the interaction between the supply of the physicians. By investigating
the sign of the slope of a single physician’s reaction function, it is easy to
see that at the intermediate equilibrium the actions of the physicians are
strategic complements. That is, if any other physician increases his number
of treatments, the point value falls, which makes the individual physician
increase his treatments as well. In contrast, in equilibrium E3, if someone
increases the number of treatments, the price falls below the threshold p
which makes another physician exit the market, which implies a reduction
in the number of treatments.23 The strategic complementarity makes the
intermediate equilibrium unstable from a phenomenological point of view.
23It is easy to see that also in equilibrium outcome E1 the number of treatments are
strategic substitutes.
15Consider the case of a ”price shock”, where everyone believes that the end-
of-year point value is lower. This makes everyone work harder, which results
in even lower prices, and thus ﬁnally in some physicians exiting the market.
Thus the intermediate equilibrium would move towards the lower equilibrium.
As mentioned above, we do not think that from an empirical point of view
equilibria E2 and E3 diﬀer very much. And, as we will show later on, also
in terms of policy implication it does not matter which of the two equilibria
we consider. Still, due to the instability of the intermediate equilibrium,
we will concentrate in the following only on equilibria E1 and E3. We call
these the ”upper” (coordinated) and ”lower” (non-coordinated) equilibrium
outcomes, as the physicians strictly prefer to end up in the upper one. Given
the anecdotal evidence we reported in the introduction, it seems to be the
case that the German physicians opted for the lower equilibrium. In some
sense this choice is understandable: If someone believes that the equilibrium
is the upper one, and he supplies less treatments, however the outcome turns
out to be the lower one, then he goes bankrupt, which comes with very high
costs. On the other hand, if the single physician works hard in the belief to
be in the lower equilibrium, then, if the outcome is the upper one, he earns
more per point than expected and surely does not go bankrupt.24
Until now we have assumed that all physicians are the same, so that
the model cannot predict who exits the market. However, the model is easily
modiﬁed to capture some heterogeneity on the side of the physicians. Assume
that physicians diﬀer with respect to the size of loans they have to repay.
In a price system, for any price p there exists a ¯ F(p) > F(p), such that a
physician with an F larger than ¯ F(p) would exit the market. A physician
with an intermediate F, i.e. F(p) < F < ¯ F(p), would work to ﬁnance his
loan. Finally, those with very small values of F, i.e. if F < F(p) would
equate price with marginal costs.
24This argumentation is similar to the one used by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) in the
discussion of a risk-dominated equilibrium. However, the generalization from a two player
game to one with inﬁnitely many players has to be considered as pure analogy, not as
theoretically well-deﬁned concept.
16The market supply curve now depends on the distribution of F. In Ap-
pendix 2 we provide an explicit example where the market supply curve is
decreasing for some range of prices. In that case, if a shift from a price to a
point system occurs, more than two equilibria can exist.
Comparing the analogue of the upper and lower equilibrium, the following
holds:
Statement 1 (Heterogeneous Physicians) Let p1 (p2) be the point value
at the upper (lower) equilibrium. Then:
Physicians with F · F(p2) supply less in the lower equilibrium.
Physicians with F(p2) · F · F(p1) work harder in the lower equilibrium.
Physicians with ¯ F(p2) < F < ¯ F(p1) stay in the market in the upper equi-
librium, but exit in the lower equilibrium.
This result gives rise to an interpretation if we assume that younger physi-
cians have larger debts to repay. Then if a shift from the upper to the lower
equilibrium occurs, one would expect that young physicians exit the market
or supply more treatments, while more elderly physicians will supply less
treatments. The result is similar if the heterogeneity is in bankruptcy costs,
and if the elder physicians have lower bankruptcy costs. Then the elderly
physicians will work less in the lower equilibrium. In this case, they might
even exit in the lower equilibrium, where prices are low.
Based on the analysis in this section, the following testable predictions
about the behaviour of physicians can be made: Assume that in a price
system physicians equate price and marginal costs, and that the budget is
large enough to cover the expenses of the price system. Then, if the system
changes from a price system to a system with a ﬁxed budget, and if the
physicians coordinate on the lower equilibrium, we expect that
1. the price per treatment, i.e. the point value, declines,
2. the net income per physician decreases,
173. some physicians will exit the market and others just avoid bankruptcy,
4. young physicians work harder or exit the market, while more elderly
physicians will work less hard.
We now proceed by providing some empirical evidence for these conclu-
sions.
5 Evidence
Using data from the German outpatient market we present empirical evidence
for our model of the previous section.
Figure 4: Point value development 1988-1997
The ﬁrst prediction of the model is strongly supported by data from
the German Federal Association of Panel Doctors. The graph in Figure 4
shows that with the switch from the fee-for-service system to the budget
18system on January 1, 1993, the point value (without prevention, laboratory
and outpatient surgery) went on a negative trend. The data is provided
by the Bavarian Association of Panel Doctors. Until the end of 1992 the
point value was relatively stable because the price was determined ex ante in
the fee-for-service system. In 1993 however the point value began to decline
rapidly. The point value for all associations of panel doctors fell by about 25%
between 1993 and 1997 for the general health insurance funds (Allgemeine
Ortskrankenkassen).25 The introduction of a maximal number of points per
practice in 1997, on which we comment below, achieved a partial stabilization
of the point value.
Also the second hypothesis is supported by the data. This is shown in
Figure 5 on the basis of the data provided by the Bavarian Association of
Panel Doctors. Nominal income peaks in 1992 and real income is more or
less constant between 1988 and end of 1992.26 During the period between
1993 and 1997 the physicians’ average nominal income dropped by about 8%
and their income in real terms declined by about 16%.
This can also be seen in Table 1, which summarizes the analysis of cost
and income structure, data collected by the Central Research Institute of
Ambulatory Health Care in Germany (related to the German Federal Asso-
ciation of Panel Doctors) and by the consulting ﬁrm GEBERA.27 Each year
2000-2500 physicians respond to an annual survey sent out to about 20% of
all physicians, chosen randomly. The survey contains data on the income
situation and cost structure of the German outpatient market.28
The table compares revenue and cost ﬁgures in a three year period before
the reform with a three year period after the reform. The ﬁrst lines of the
25The point value for the substitute health insurance funds (Ersatzkassen) dropped by
the same amount. Both groups, general and substitute health insurance funds counted
together for more than 80% of the funding of the German public market for ambulatory
physicians. To see how the population is distributed on the various insurance funds see
Federal Association of Panel Doctors (1999, Table G17).
26To adjust for inﬂation the consumer price index for families with higher income was
used.
27See also Deutsches ¨ Arzteblatt (1997).
28See Zentralinstitut (1988-1998).
19Figure 5: Real and nominal physicians’ income 1988-1997
table show that the reform did not lead to declining revenues. The revenue
from outpatient care rose by 1:9% and other revenues rose by 4:9%, leading to
an increase in total revenues by 2:5%. Other revenues have been mainly made
up by treatments of privately insured patients (with a fee-for-service system)
and by treatments which are not listed in the uniform evaluation standard,
which describes the outpatient services reimbursed by the reimbursement
center in the budget system.
However, at the same time, total monetary expenditures went up rapidly.
On average they increased by about 8:9% between these two periods. The
driving force being labor expenditures which rose by 11:3%. As a result, the
ratio of total expenditures to revenues rose from 56:7% to 60:3%. In terms of
surplus, deﬁned as revenue minus costs, this amounts to a decline of about
6% between the average of 1990-1992 and the average of 1993-1995 .
The third hypothesis is by nature hard to test. Although bankruptcies
20Table 1: Changes in physicians’ income in West Germany
mean 1990 to 1992 mean 1993 to 1995 value change
mean/DM % mean/DM % % 4 % 4 p.a.
revenue from
outpatient care 368,418 80.7 375,512 80,2 1.9 0.6
other revenues 87,945 19.3 92,240 19.8 4.9 1.6
total revenue 456,363 100.0 467,752 100.0 2.5 0.8
costs
labor costs 112,740 43.6 125,480 44.5 11.3 3.6
other costs 146,110 56.4 156,484 55.4 7.1 2.3
total costs 258,850 100.0 281,964 100.0 8.9 2.9
total costs in
% of revenue 56.7 60.3 6.3 2.1
surplus 197,513 185,788 -6.0 -2,0
Source: Statistics of the ZI, own calculations
can be detected - and there are not very many -, surviving at the margin
of bankruptcy is hard to ﬁnd out. Still, there is anecdotical evidence for an
increasing number of practices which seem to exist at the margin to survive:
This “critical frontier” with a turnover of less than 120,000 Deutsch Marks
confronts 6,600 physicians out of 110,000 in outpatient care (Handelsblatt,
1999).29
6 Coordination Mechanisms
To avoid the from the physician’s prospective undesired consequences, namely
the lower outcome, there are two possibilities: First, consider a system where
a budget is given, but physicians are guaranteed that the point value will not
fall below some prespeciﬁed value. If it does, then the budget will be aug-
mented so that every physician obtains this value. Then, for particular values
29Concerning the fourths hypothesis, we were unfortunately unable to obtain data on the
behaviour of diﬀerent groups of physicians (young/old). This will be left to future research.
Nevertheless, there is anecdotical evidence that young physicians with own practices are
more likely to live at the “critical frontier”. (Handelsblatt, 1999)
21of the size of the budget and the lower point value, the outcome of the game
above can be unique:
Lemma 1 (Point value guarantee) In a remuneration system with a ﬁxed
budget and a point value guarantee, such that the budget is augmented if the
point value falls below the guaranteed level physicians will coordinate on the
upper equilibrium and the budget will be met.
Proof The proof is done by noting that if the point value guarantee lies
above the two lower equilibria of the previous game, then these two can
not be equilibrium outcomes anymore. However, the upper, coordinated
equilibrium can still be the outcome (and is the unique equilibrium), as here
the point value guarantee does not bind. Q.E.D.
This can be seen in Figure 6 : Due to the point value guarantee the
budget line has a kink at the level ˇ p. If the value of ˇ p is large enough, there
is only one intersection of the budget line with the supply-curve. Therefore
only the upper equilibrium E1 exists.
Figure 6: The point-system, modiﬁed by a point value guarantee
A second possibility to avoid the coordination problem is given by prospec-
tively implementing a maximal number of treatments per physician into the
22budget system. The number of treatments beyond this predetermined num-
ber of treatments per individual physician will not be remunerated by the
reimbursement centers:
Lemma 2 (Maximal number of treatments) In a remuneration system
with a ﬁxed budget and a maximal number of treatments per physician, physi-
cians will coordinate on the upper equilibrium and the budget will be met.
Proof To avoid the not desired treadmill eﬀect, this maximal number of
treatments per physician (ˇ n) has to lie above the two lower equilibria. Like in
the case of a point value guarantee, the upper (coordinated) equilibrium can
still be the outcome, because in this case the maximal number of treatments
does not bind. Q.E.D.
This can be seen in Figure 7 : Due to the maximal number of treatments
for each individual physician, the budget line stops exactly at the level of ˇ n.
If, given the previous upper equilibrium, the maximal number of treatments
is relatively small, there is again only one intersection of the budget line with
the supply-curve, the unique equilibrium E1.
The consequences of either a guaranteed point value or a maximal num-
ber of treatments per physician are the same in this model: The undesired
treadmill eﬀect can be avoided.
However, if we go beyond the model these two methods of solving the
coordination problem become very diﬀerent. We discuss three eﬀects.
First, consider the consequences of a health shock, like e.g. an unanticipated
wave of inﬂuenza. In the case of a predetermined maximal number of treat-
ments per physician there will not be enough supply to treat all patients. In
the other case, where a minimal point value is guaranteed, the budget will
be augmented and all patients with inﬂuenza will be treated.30
30In this context it is often argued that a pure budget system (without a point value
guarantee) will shift risk from the sickness funds to the physicians. In a companion paper,
where we relax the assumption of pure Supplier Induced Demand, we show that this
statement does not hold if ﬁxed costs are much larger than variable costs. See Benstetter
and Wambach (2000)
23Figure 7: The point-system, modiﬁed by a maximal number of treatments
per physician
Second, we also have to take into account that practices vary by size and by
the distribution of their patients. Thus implementing a maximal number of
treatments per physician requires detailed knowledge of each practices, while
a point value guarantee does not need much further information.
A third issue arises if we allow for a dynamic setting. In the system with
a guaranteed lower bound on the point value, it might be the case that if
physicians fear falling point values and therefore falling income levels in fu-
ture periods, they will expand their treatments in the present period to cash
in today. Thus the budget needs to be augmented. On the other hand,
such an eﬀect is not possible in a budget system with a maximal number of
treatments per physician and period.
In June 1997 the reimbursement system in Germany shifted from a pure
budget to the so-called ”Practice-budget”, which includes a maximal num-
ber of treatments per physician (and which is a budget on points rather than
on money). This maximal number depends on the calculated average treat-
ments per group of physicians and on age of the patients. Although this
comes close to the system proposed here, it diﬀers in that the point-value is
24ﬁxed as long as physicians do not reach their limit on the number of treat-
ments. The introduction of this system with a maximal number of treatment
came - as discussed before - with huge administrative eﬀort. However, the
alternative instrument of a minimum point value would have been more dif-
ﬁcult to implement: The German associations for panel doctors would have
not only required the agreement by the public sickness fund, they also needed
a diﬀerent legal framework to be provided by the government.31
7 Market Entry
In this section we extend the model and allow for market entry. The market
entry decision is inﬂuenced by the payment regime in the (regulated) physi-
cians market and with that by the well-being of the active physicians. As
a matter of fact, due to the declining income of physicians more and more
young physicians in Germany decide nowadays to work in alternative jobs
like in business consulting, hospitals, pharmaceutical industry etc (compare
Berliner Morgenpost (1999)). We model market entry by introducing a stage
0, in which new physicians (those ﬁnishing their ”probationary period”) can
decide to enter the market. For simplicity we assume that if they enter, they
also have to repay the debt F in the following period. If they do not enter,
they take an alternative job which comes with utility ˆ U, which is assumed
to be positive. The stock of possible entrants is given by SE. We denote the
number of entrants in equilibrium by ±. Then, in stage 1, 1 + ± physicians
decide simultaneously how many treatments, if any, they supply. Compared
to the game in Section 4 the payoﬀ-function has to be redeﬁned, because the
31As discussed before, the guarantee of a minimal point value makes the coordination of
the physicians possible. In 1998 the Bavarian association of panel doctors together with the
primary sickness fund implemented the so-called ”Regelleistungsvolumen”, a modiﬁcation
of the point system in which few parts could be interpreted as a point value guarantee:
Also here a point value was guaranteed, however only for a limited predetermined number
of treatments. Treatments above this predetermined number had been reimbursed only
by a downward graduated point value. Because of a new law in the German health system
(”Vorschaltgesetz”) in January 1999, this system could not be tested further.
25number of physicians in stage 1 has now changed to 1 + ±.32 The pay-oﬀ for
physician x who is in the market in stage 1 and assuming that he does not





n(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) ¡ c2(n(x)) ¡ F (3)
In a regulated system like e.g. the German health market (but also many
other health systems) the regulating authority faces two main problems:
First, to provide the right incentives for the supply of treatments. Second, to
ﬁnd the right overall reimbursement level for physicians.33 In contract the-
ory terms: Even if the structure of the second best contracts induced by the
incentive constraint is clear, it still needs to be determined how the overall
level of the reimbursement per physician, as spelled out by the participation
constraint, is set. In contract theory, it is usually just assumed that a partic-
ipation constraint exists.34 In the health sector, there is no obvious level for
the size of the participation constraint: How much should a physician earn?
What reimbursement induces the right level of entry? Using competitive
analysis, one would expect that wage equal to marginal product would be
the appropriate payment. Paying more induces excessive entry, while paying
less will lead to a reduction in entry (or a shift towards lower quality physi-
cians). One possible indicator for the right payment could be the outside
option physicians have. If that market (consulting, pharmaceutical indus-
try) is much less regulated than the health care market, the payment there
should be close to productivity. We therefore interpret ˆ U as the correct over-
all level of reimbursement for physicians with the following implication: If
physicians expect to earn ˆ U in the market for physician services, the desired
number of entry to this market will be induced.35
32We index the physicians who are in the market at stage 1 by x 2 [0;1 + ±].
33While the ﬁrst question is addressed excessively in the literature (for summary see
Gaynor (1994)), the second problem has received very little attention.
34E.g. Ma and McGuire (1997) assume a reservation utility for the physician.
35In our homogeneous model the following holds: If expected earnings are larger (lower)
than ˆ U, all (no) physicians will enter. Both alternatives are suboptimal. Only for expected
26With these preliminaries, the following observation can be made:
Lemma 3 If the equilibrium of the subgame at stage 1 is not the upper one,
then no additional physician will enter the market.
If the equilibrium of the subgame at stage 1 is the upper one, then depend-
ing on the size of the budget, either all new physicians or no new physician







¤) ¡ F (4)
where n¤ is the equilibrium number of treatments at stage 1.
The reasoning is obvious. Physicians will only enter the market if they
expect to obtain more or as much as by staying away. This can only be
the case in the upper equilibrium. If the expected proﬁt there without any
entry is less than the outside option, no one will enter. If it is larger, then
so many physicians will enter until the stock of entrants is exhausted or the
expected proﬁt is equal to the outside option. The most interesting case is
the latter scenario, where exactly so many physicians enter that their outside
option equals the expected proﬁt they obtain in the market itself. Given the
remarks above on the interpretation of ˆ U this implies that market entry is
optimal. So, if physicians coordinate on the upper outcome, a ﬁxed budget
will lead to an improved allocation of human capital.
This can be seen in Figure 8: Market entry will shift the budget line to
the left until the expected proﬁt of the marginal physician, who wants to
enter the market, is equal to his outside-option.
This last result points towards the potential a ﬁxed budget has: It might
be a useful tool to appropriately regulate market entry. If, as can be assumed,
the right size of reimbursement is not known to the government and to the
reimbursement center, introducing a budget can be a self-sustaining method
earnings equal to ˆ U, optimal entry can be expected.
27Figure 8: The point system can regulate market entry
to elicit this level of compensation. But, as argued previously, the proposed
(improved) budget system can only work properly if suﬃcient measures are
in place to avoid the lower, uncoordinated outcome, in which physicians face
the ”treadmill eﬀect”.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a model of demand inducing physicians which has the
property that if prices are high, physicians behave like proﬁt maximizers,
while for low prices they behave like satisﬁcers, inducing demand to reach
a target income. This target income is given by the monetary costs of the
practice. With this model a reimbursement system where the budget is
ﬁxed is investigated. Due to a coordination problem physicians may end
up in an equilibrium where they have to endure the treadmill eﬀect. The
point value falls, the number of treatments increases, and some physicians
are forced to exit the market. We provide evidence for these predictions in
the German physicians market. However, if physicians succeed to avoid the
coordination problem, then a ﬁxed budget has the positive eﬀect that it leads
28to desired market entry. A possible coordination device could be that to a
ﬁxed budget a point value guarantee is added, which in equilibrium will not
be used. In our model this coordination device leads to the same result as
implementing a prospective maximal number of treatments into the budget
system. However, a lower bound on the point-value will establish suﬃcient
health service in case of health shocks and will be much easier to administer.
When implementing this measure, however, the government needs to assure
to the physician community that it will not cut the budget in future years.
29A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Let n(y);y 6= x be the equilibrium strategies of the physicians apart from
physician x. Deﬁne p as p = B R 1
0 n(y)dy where we set some ﬁnite n = n(x).
Note that p is independent of n(x) as long as it is ﬁnite. Then the pay-oﬀs





pn(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) ¡ c2(n(x) ¡ F if pn(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) ¸ F
¡c2(n(x)) ¡ BK if pn(x) ¡ c1(n(x)) < F
(5)
But this is exactly the same proﬁt function as was derived in the section on
the price system. The optimal n(x) is the chosen analogue to the derivation
in the proof of Proposition 1. Thus we can interpret the supply function
as the response function of the individual physician. The next steps are
straightforward: Note that for any ’price’ p = B R 1
0 n(y)dy there is a unique best
response of physician x as long as p 6= p. We call this n(p). The same
argument applies for the other physicians. Therefore in the equilibrium all
physicians supply the same number of treatments. An equilibrium of such a
form exists if and only if one can ﬁnd a value for p such that p = B
n(p). We
return to the issue of existence below.
Now consider the case where the ’price’ p = B R 1
0 n(y)dy is equal to p. Then
the best response of physician x is either to work very hard, i.e. to choose
n = ¯ n, or to exit the market, i.e. to choose n = 0. The same reasoning
applies for all physicians, so such an equilibrium price exists if one can ﬁnd
an ® with 0 · ® < 1 such that p = B
(1¡®)¯ n. If ® is strictly larger than zero,
then some physicians go bankrupt in equilibrium.36 Having shown the form
of the possible equilibria, we now turn to existence.
36There are several possible equilibrium strategies which would lead to this result: Either
all physicians mix between exiting the market and working hard with probability (® :
1 ¡ ®), or a proportion ® of physicians with say x · ® exit the market, the others work
hard, etc. The equilibrium outcome, however, has always the same structure.
30Consider ﬁrst the case where all physicians supply the same number of
treatments. This can only be an equilibrium if p = B
n(p), or, in other words, if
the line B=n cuts the supply line for the individual doctor (see Figure 2 and
Figure 3). It is obvious that if B is very small such a crossing will not occur
(the possibility curve to the left in Figure 3). Therefore B is deﬁned such
that the line B=n just touches the supply curve. On the other hand, if B is
very large (the possibility curve to the right in Figure 3), it crosses the supply
curve only once in the region where supply is increasing in p. Accordingly,
¯ B is deﬁned such that ¯ B=¯ n = p, i.e. the two curves touch at the point where
the physicians just avoid bankruptcy. For all intermediate levels of B there
are at least two crossing points (as shown in Figure 2). We now proof that
there are at most two crossing points:
It is obvious that in the region of the supply curve where n increases in p the
two curves can cross at most once, as B=n is decreasing in n. It remains to
show that also in the region where n decreases with p at most one crossing
occurs. Suppose the two curves cross at a point p = B=n = (F + c1(n))=n.
The slopes of the two curves at this point are given by ¡B=n2 = ¡p=n versus
¡(F + c1(n))=n2 + c0
1(n)=n = ¡p=n + c0
1=n. Therefore the budget curve will
always decrease more than the supply curve, which in turn implies that there
is at most one crossing in this region. Finally, it remains to show that an
equilibrium, where some ® physicians go bankrupt, exist. By the deﬁnition




A.2 Downward curving supply with heterogeneous
physicians
Physicians diﬀer with respect to the size of the loan F they have to repay.
Denote by G(F) the distribution function. To derive an explicit example of a
supply function, we simplify by assuming that monetary costs are quadratic,
31i.e. c1(n) = 1
2®n2 and eﬀort costs are linear, i.e. c2(n) = ¯n.
Now we are in a position to derive the explicit values of F(p) and ¯ F(p).
For small F, the physician sets price equal to marginal cost. Therefore






He can do so as long as his monetary income covers his loan. Therefore, F(p)
is deﬁned by pn¤(p) ¡ 1





For values of F larger than F but not too large, the physician will work to








p2 ¡ 2®F] (8)
It directly follows that n(p;F) decreases in p and increases in F. ¯ F can now
be derived. As discussed in Section 3, there are two possible reasons why
a physician might declare bankruptcy: Either the price exceeds monetary
marginal costs or eﬀort costs exceed bankruptcy costs.
1.) In the ﬁrst case, p = ®n(p; ¯ F), which gives
p

















































For our numerical example, we assume in addition that F is distributed
uniformly on [0; ˆ F]. By using the following values: ® = 1, ¯ = 8, ˆ F = 8;5
and BK large enough, a supply curve is obtained which is partly downward
sloping. The curve is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Market Supply Curve
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